John Searle’s Chinese Room Argument purports to demonstrate that syntax is not sufficient for semantics, and, hence, because computation cannot yield understanding, the computational theory of mind, which equates the mind to an information processing system based on formal computations, fails. In this paper, we use the CRA, and the debate that emerged from it, to develop a philosophical critique of recent advances in robotics and neuroscience. We describe results from a body of work that contributes to blurring the divide (...) between biological and artificial systems; so-called animats, autonomous robots that are controlled by biological neural tissue and what may be described as remote-controlled rodents, living animals endowed with augmented abilities provided by external controllers. We argue that, even though at first sight, these chimeric systems may seem to escape the CRA, on closer analysis, they do not. We conclude by discussing the role of the body–brain dynamics in the processes that give rise to genuine understanding of the world, in line with recent proposals from enactive cognitive science. (shrink)

The paper describes in detail the procedure of identification of the inner language and an inner logico of a physical theory. The procedure is a generalization of the original ideas of J. von Neuman and G. Birkhoff about quantum logic.

The "space" of Lascar strong types, on some sort and relative to a given complete theory T, is in general not a compact Hausdorff topological space. We have at least three aims in this paper. The first is to show that spaces of Lascar strong types, as well as other related spaces and objects such as the Lascar group Gal L of T, have well-defined Borel cardinalities. The second is to compute the Borel cardinalities of the known examples as well (...) as of some new examples that we give. The third is to explore notions of definable map, embedding, and isomorphism, between these and related quotient objects. We also make some conjectures, the main one being roughly "smooth if and only if trivial". The possibility of a descriptive set-theoretic account of the complexity of spaces of Lascar strong types was touched on in the paper [E. Casanovas, D. Lascar, A. Pillay and M. Ziegler, Galois groups of first order theories, J. Math. Logic1 305–319], where the first example of a "non-G-compact theory" was given. The motivation for writing this paper is partly the discovery of new examples via definable groups, in [A. Conversano and A. Pillay, Connected components of definable groups and o-minimality I, Adv. Math.231 605–623; Connected components of definable groups and o-minimality II, to appear in Ann. Pure Appl. Logic] and the generalizations in [J. Gismatullin and K. Krupiński, On model-theoretic connected components in some group extensions, preprint, arXiv:1201.5221v1]. (shrink)

Open peer commentary on the article “Exploration of the Functional Properties of Interaction: Computer Models and Pointers for Theory” by Etienne B. Roesch, Matthew Spencer, Slawomir J. Nasuto, Thomas Tanay & J. Mark Bishop. Upshot: We challenge the authors’ claim in the target article that “departing from cognitivism requires the development of a new functional framework that will support causal, powerful and goal-directed behavior in the context of the interaction between the organism and the environment.” We argue that rather (...) than a departure from cognitivism, the indicated goal is a natural complement or extension of the classical understanding of cognitivism. In order to reach such a goal, no new functional framework has to be developed right from scratch: there are many insights in related areas of research that can serve such a purpose well and can become an integral part of constructive cognitivism. We welcome the idea to build constructive foundations of cognitivism. (shrink)

In this paper, we complement proximate or ‘how’ explanations for the origins of language, broadening our perspective to include fitness-consequences explanations, i.e. ultimate, or ‘why’ explanations. We identify the platform of trust as a fundamental prerequisite for the development of a language-like system of symbolic communication. The platform of trust is a social niche in which cheap but honest communication with non-kin is possible, because messages tend to be trusted as a default. We briefly consider the place of the platform (...) of trust on the road map as laid out in the Mirror System Hypothesis. We then turn to recent research on turn-taking in primates, which has been proposed as a precursor of the cooperative structuring of conversation in humans. We suggest, instead, that human turn-taking, in its full richness that makes it an interesting explanatory target, may only appear in a communicative system that is already founded on a community-wide, cooperative platform of trust. (shrink)

Information can be public among a group. Whether or not information is public matters, for example, for accounts of interdependent rational choice, of communication, and of joint intention. A standard analysis of public information identifies it with (some variant of) common belief. The latter notion is stipulatively defined as an infinite conjunction: for p to be commonly believed is for it to believed by all members of a group, for all members to believe that all members believe it, and so (...) forth. This analysis is often presupposed without much argument in philosophy. Theoretical entrenchment or intuitions about cases might give some traction on the question, but give little insight about why the identification holds, if it does. The strategy of this paper is to characterize a practical-normative role for information being public, and show that the only things that play that role are (variants of) common belief as stipulatively characterized. In more detail: a functional role for “taking a proposition for granted” in non-isolated decision making is characterized. I then present some minimal conditions under which such an attitude is correctly held. The key assumption links this attitude to beliefs about what is public. From minimal a priori principles, we can argue that a proposition being public among a group entails common commitment to believe among that group. Later sections explore partial converses to this result, the factivity of publicity and publicity from the perspective of outsiders to the group, and objections to the aprioricity of the result deriving from a posteriori existential presuppositions. (shrink)

Ned Block argues that the higher-order (HO) approach to explaining consciousness is ‘defunct’ because a prominent objection (the ‘misrepresentation objection’) exposes the view as ‘incoherent’. What’s more, a response to this objection that I’ve offered elsewhere (Weisberg 2010) fails because it ‘amounts to abusing the notion of what-it’s-like-ness’ (xxx).1 In this response, I wish to plead guilty as charged. Indeed, I will continue herein to abuse Block’s notion of what-it’s-like-ness. After doing so, I will argue that the HO approach accounts (...) for the sense of what-it’s-like-ness that matters in a theory of consciousness. I will also argue that the only incoherence present in the HO theory is that generated by embracing Block’s controversial notion of what-it’s-like-ness, something no theorist of any stripe ought to do. Block is famous for (among other things) having introduced the notion of ‘phenomenal consciousness’ into contemporary philosophy of mind (Block 1995). This term is widely employed in the philosophical literature and it even appears in the empirical literature. But wide-speared usage has brought about divergent interpretations of the term. We can distinguish a ‘moderate’ and a ‘zealous’ reading of ‘phenomenal consciousness’. On the moderate reading, ‘phenomenal consciousness’ just means ‘experience’. Many people have embraced this sense of the term and use it to roughly pick out conscious experience involving sensory quality (states like conscious visual experiences or conscious pains, for example).2 On the zealous reading, however, phenomenal consciousness is held to be ‘distinct from any cognitive, intentional, or functional property’ (Block 1995: 234). That is, any explanation of phenomenal consciousness in exclusively cognitive, intentional, or functional terms will fail to capture, without remainder, what is really distinctive about phenomenal consciousness. Block, of course, is fully clear about embracing the zealous reading; indeed, his initial introduction of the notion is in those terms. The same ambiguity occurs with the much-used (and abused) idea of ‘what-it’s-like-ness’.. (shrink)

The set of design features developed by Charles Hockett in the 1950s and 1960s remains probably the most influential means of juxtaposing animal communication with human language. However, the general theoretical perspective of Hockett is largely incompatible with that of modern language evolution research. Consequently, we argue that his classificatory system—while useful for some descriptive purposes—is of very limited use as a theoretical framework for evolutionary linguistics. We see this incompatibility as related to the ontology of language, i.e. deriving from (...) Hockett’s interest in language as a product rather than a suite of sensorimotor, cognitive and social abilities that enable the use but also acquisition of language by biological creatures. After a reconstruction of Hockett’s views on design features, we raise two criticisms: focus on the means at the expense of content and focus on the code itself rather than the cognitive abilities of its users. Finally, referring to empirical data, we illustrate some of the problems resulting from Hockett’s approach by addressing three specific points—namely arbitrariness and semanticity, cultural transmission, and displacement—and show how the change of perspective allows to overcome those difficulties. (shrink)

We study the variety generated by the three-element equivalential algebra with conjunction on the dense elements. We prove the representation theorem which let us construct the free algebras in this variety.

We study the structure of analytic ideals of subsets of the natural numbers. For example, we prove that for an analytic ideal I, either the ideal {X (Ω × Ω: En X ({0, 1,…,n} × Ω } is Rudin-Keisler below I, or I is very simply induced by a lower semicontinuous submeasure. Also, we show that the class of ideals induced in this manner by lsc submeasures coincides with Polishable ideals as well as analytic P-ideals. We study this class of (...) ideals and characterize, for example, when the ideals in it are Fσ or when they carry a locally compact group topology. We apply these results to Borel partial orders to rederive a theorem of Todorcevic and to Borel equivalence relations to answer a question of Kechris and Louveau. As another application we give a characterization of σ-ideals of μ-zero sets for Maharam submeasures μ on the Cantor set which is to a large extent analogous to a characterization of the meager ideal due to Kechris and the author. (shrink)

We applaud Heintz & Scott-Phillips's guiding metaphor of “unleashing leashed expression,” and we value the unified explanation for the emergence of not only language, but also other forms of unleashed expression, such as multimodal communication. We are more critical of the authors' discussion of the selection pressures acting towards unleashed expression, which are proposed to hinge on partner choice ecology.

We construct free algebras in the variety generated by the equivalential algebra with conjunction on dense elements and compute the formula for the free spectrum of this variety. Moreover, we describe the decomposition of free algebras into directly indecomposable factors.

The paper presents an analysis of the ethical, political and economic aspects of human work within two Polish historical periods – the years of the People’s Republic of Poland and after 1989. The starting point for the analysis was the assumption that every time period, each age, leaves a mark on man’s work. Analysis of the People's Republic of Poland period gives an opportunity to consider human work understood as a duty and right of every human guaranteed by the Constitution (...) of 1952. Questioning the principles ruling the labour market by the ideologists of the People’s Republic of Poland and, as a consequence, the politicization of labour, resulted in the collapse of the work ethic. Work, as it was at that time a commonly available good, lost its value, regarded as the source of life satisfaction, and thus became ridiculed. After 1989, in relation to the de-politicization of the Polish labour market, the employee became active in searching for a job. The phenomenon of unemployment resulted in competition on the labour market and the employer was thus given the opportunity to freely select a group of employees. As a result, the employer became a distributor of a ‘rare commodity.’ That, in turn, led to the situation where the approach of employers towards employees turned into the employer's diktat. It is the employer who determines the conditions of employment, standards of work and place of work. A lack of alternative that many employees face often makes them accept the dictated conditions of work. What is more, in Poland we deal with the insufficiently developed participation of employees in managing the enterprises, which is an effect of breaking off the bilateral dependency of employee and employer. (shrink)

The aim of this paper is to outline the general oversight of the concept of law in Leon Petrażycki’s legal theory. On the example of the principles of law, an attempt was made to answer the question, what Petrażycki’s theory proposes to modern science. In the first part of the presentation, the Author presented the current state of theoretical knowledge in the field of principles of law. The attention was paid to the problem of various characteristics of legal principles. In (...) further considerations, an attempt was made to answer the question about adoption of models proposed by Petrażycki in the contemporary theoretical discourse. The summary presents general conclusions of the paper. (shrink)

Livio Rossetti, Le dialogue socratique, Éditions Les Belles Lettres, Paris 2011, ss. 296.

§1. Introduction. Ideals and filters of subsets of natural numbers have been studied by set theorists and topologists for a long time. There is a vast literature concerning various kinds of ultrafilters. There is also a substantial interest in nicely definable ideals—these by old results of Sierpiński are very far from being maximal— and the structure of such ideals will concern us in this announcement. In addition to being interesting in their own right, Borel and analytic ideals occur naturally in (...) the investigations of compact subsets of the space of all Baire class 1 functions on a Polish space, see [12, 18]. Also, certain objects associated with such ideals are of considerable interest and were quite extensively studied by several authors. Let us list here three examples; in all three of them I stands for an analytic or Borel ideal.1. The partial order induced by I on P: X ≥I Y iff X \ Y ϵ I and the partial order.2. Boolean algebras of the form P/I and their automorphisms.3. The equivalence relation associated with I: XEI Y iff X Δ ϵ I.In Section 4, we will have an opportunity to state some consequences of our results for equivalence relations as in 3. (shrink)

A new approach to semantics, based on ordered Banach spaces, is proposed. The Banach spaces semantics arises as a generalization of the four particular cases: the Giles' approach to belief structures, its generalization to the non-Boolean case, and fuzzy extensions of Boolean as well as of non-Boolean semantics.

Telling a patient that the outcome of his illness is not good, or even hopeless, requires sensitivity and the ability to communicate with him in the setting of a hospital which is an unnatural environment divorced from family and friends. It is a task which must be taught and learned by doctors and nurses.